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Abstract 
Social scientists and practitioners have been limited in their work by the paucity of data about 
subnational institutions and practices.  Such data could help scholars refine regime typologies, 
improve theories of democratization and regime change, better understand subnational 
democracy, and illuminate issues of development, conflict, and governance.  They could also 
enable democracy and development advocates to design more effective programs and officials to 
create better policies.  This paper addresses the lack of data by introducing 22 subnational 
measures from a new dataset, Varieties of Democracy.  Validity tests demonstrate that the 
measures’ strengths outweigh their weaknesses. The measures excel in covering all subnational 
levels for most countries, capturing different elements of subnational elections, and including a 
variety of dimensions of elections and civil liberties.  The measures also offer unmatched global 
and temporal coverage.  The paper demonstrates how these strengths can provide scholars and 
practitioners with the benefits described above. 
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Introduction 
A democratic country should provide responsive government institutions and political freedoms 
throughout its territory.  Every province, city, and village should afford its residents with these 
guarantees.  The importance of subnational democracy has been emphasized most prominently 
by the United Nations, which has set as an objective to “[e]nsure responsive, inclusive, 
participatory and representative decision-making at all levels.”i Yet, scholars have found that even 
in numerous countries that we label as democratic or democratizing democracy does not exist 
throughout the territories.  In their work, practitioners and scholars tend to overlook this in-
country variation by treating a country where democracy is absent at the local level or from a 
large swath of territory the same as a country with democratic institutions and practices 
throughout its territory.  Attention to subnational politics can enable practitioners to develop 
democracy-promotion programs and foreign policies better suited to particular countries.  It can 
also help scholars refine regime typologies and improve theories of democratization and regime 
change.  These benefits have been largely out of reach, however, because crossnational 
democracy indices have failed to measure subnational institutions and practices.  
To help address this problem, this paper introduces a set of subnational measures from 
the new Varieties of Democracy dataset (V-Dem). Twenty-two indicators of subnational 
institutions and practices cover all countries of the world, except microstates, from 1900 to 2012.  
They provide information about typical institutions and practices, but also about variation and 
outliers.  The measures are derived from country expert responses to V-Dem survey instruments 
and are available free-of-charge on the internet.ii Beyond introducing these measures, the purpose 
of this paper is to validate them and demonstrate their utility.  The analysis shows that the 
measures capture all subnational levels for most countries, elements of subnational elections, and 
a variety of dimensions of elections and civil liberties.  The measures also offer excellent global 
and temporal coverage.  The measures are weaker in capturing multiple meanings of government 
authority and constraints and providing valid data about when subnational elections are held.  On 
balance, the strengths outweigh the weaknesses, making the measures useful to improving regime 
typologies and theories of regime change as well as to better understanding development, 
conflict, governance, and, of course, subnational politics. 
The paper proceeds by documenting the paucity of subnational data from other sources.  
I then describe the conceptualization and operationalization of the V-Dem subnational indicators 
to show how they help fill this void.  The next section assesses the quality of the V-Dem 
measures by examining their face and content validity, the data generation process, and the 
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measures’ convergent validity.  The final section demonstrates how the measures can illuminate 
questions of importance in social science and assist practitioners.        
 
Limited Data from Other Sources 
Other than from V-Dem, global, time series data about subnational democratic institutions and 
practices are not available.  Most sources of subnational information examine administrative 
structure, government performance, and decentralization,iii not democratic institutions or 
processes.  Global regime and democracy datasets, such as Freedom House, Polity, and Boix, 
Miller, and Rosato do not provide subnational measures.  Nearly all datasets that do focus on 
subnational democracy provide data for only one part of the world.  The Council of Europe’s 
Structure and Operation of Local and Regional Democracy reports on European countries, for example.iv  
Those that do cover numerous parts of the world do not include all countries and provide data 
for only one year or a short period of time.  An additional problem is that data are often not 
comparable across countries.  For example, the Global Observatory on Local Democracy and 
Decentralisation (GOLD) has profiles of 101 countries, but the data provided are not consistent 
across countries.v      
    A swell of subnational democracy research beginning in the 1990s has provided valuable 
findings about subnational regimes but no global datasets.  Most studies examine only one to 
four provinces in a country.  Data from this literature are further limited by level, geography and 
time.  Most data are from the regional level, to the exclusion of the local level.  Moreover, most 
of the work has been done in Latin America and Russia.  Most commonly studied are Argentina, 
Brazil, Mexico, and Russia, but also Germany, India, Kyrgyzstan, the Philippines, South Africa, 
and the United States.vi  Most of these countries are large and were federalist and recently 
politically liberalized when they were investigated.  These similarities further reduce the diversity 
of the data.  Data from different works are not comparable because scholars have used different 
conceptualizations and operationalizations, and crossnational studies are rare.  Consequently, it is 
impossible to build a global dataset from existing works.  Finally, temporal coverage is limited; 
most of the studies are of the third wave era.   
 In sum, neither existing datasets nor the subnational democracy literature provides us 
with global, time series data on subnational institutions and practices.  To address this problem, 
the first step in creating the V-Dem indicators was to conceptualize the term “subnational 
democracy.” 
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Conceptualization of Subnational Democracy for V-Dem 
For a territory within a country to be characterized as more or less democratic it must exist as an 
administrative unit with its own government.vii Subnational government makes subnational 
democracy possible while also contributing to the extent of democracy in a country.  Proximity of 
government can facilitate citizens’ political engagement and thus increase the extent of 
participation in the country.  This reflects the view of democracy that emphasizes participation.   
The subnational government is more democratic if its offices are elected through free and 
fair elections.  This follows from the electoral principle of democracy, and it promotes the 
participatory principle of democracy by allowing citizens to vote for more officials.   It is also 
important that the elected offices have authority relative to unelected offices and can constrain 
the actions of unelected officials.  This enables elected officials to act on voters’ preferences and 
citizens, through the electoral process, to limit the actions of government.  These practices allow 
for responsive government, the essence of democracy.viii  To facilitate the freeness and fairness of 
the elections and enable citizens to engage with these offices, respect for civil liberties in the 
subnational units is essential.  This draws on the liberal principle of democracy.   
Following from this logic, the V-Dem subnational indicators include three fundamental 
elements of democracy— elections, government authority and constraints, and civil liberties.  
And, the indicators reflect three of the main principles of democracy—participatory, electoral, 
and liberal.ix  
 
Operationalization of V-Dem Subnational Indicators 
Two challenges must be overcome in order to translate this conceptualization of subnational 
democracy into measurements:  multiple subnational levels and many subnational units.  To 
address the first problem, country experts identified two subnational levels for data collection—
regional, meaning the second-highest level of government, just below the national government, 
and local, meaning the level below the region.  The appendix provides a complete list of 
variables, including these, v2elreggov and v2ellocgov.  (Details about the experts appear in Data 
Generation Process below.)  To deal with countries that have more than two subnational levels, 
the survey instructs the experts to select the  regional level and the local level “that, in practice, 
has the most responsibilities (e.g. making laws, providing primary education, maintaining roads, 
policing, etc.) and resources to carry out those responsibilities.”  
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The number of subnational units within a single country can be large. For example, Brazil 
has 5,562 municipios, composing just one of its levels of subnational government.x  Thus, it was 
not feasible to create a global dataset that measures the extent of democracy in each unit.  Rather 
the V-Dem indicators collect data about subnational averages, distributions, and outliers.  For 
example, to evaluate the freeness and fairness of subnational elections, the survey first asks about 
elections on average (v2elffelr): “Taking all aspects of the pre-election period, election day, and 
the post-election process into account, would you consider subnational elections (regional and 
local, as previously identified) to be free and fair on average?”  Experts then respond to questions 
about the distribution (v2elsnlsff): “Does the freeness and fairness of subnational elections vary 
across different areas of the country?” Finally, the experts provide information about the outliers 
(v2elsnless, v2elsnlpop, v2elsnlfc, v2elsnmore, v2elsnmpop, v2elsnmrfc).  They identify the areas 
with significantly less free and fair elections and significantly more free and fair elections, estimate 
the percentages of the country’s population living in each, and identify characteristics shared by 
each type of outlier.  The approach to measuring civil liberties is similar with two exceptions 
(v2clrgunev, v2clsnmpct, v2clrgstch, v2clsnlpct, v2clrgwkch).  First, because subnational units do 
not typically codify civil liberties, the average can be found using the civil liberties indicators or 
indices for the country as a whole rather than a specific subnational measure.xi Second, to avoid 
expert fatigue, the civil liberties survey did not ask experts to name specific geographic areas 
where government respect for civil liberties is significantly stronger and areas where it is 
significantly weaker.  We also suspected that these areas should overlap at least somewhat with 
areas with more or less free and fair elections due to the importance of rights to election quality.      
For other elements of subnational democracy the measures provide only information 
about averages for empirical and practical reasons.  The existence of subnational government and 
subnational offices and their relative power are likely less variable than the quality of subnational 
elections, for example.  Existing research on subnational democracy provides support for this.  
This more limited approach was taken for the other concepts also because of finite resources.  
Following from this conceptualization and operationalization, 22 indicators were created.  
Four address the existence of subnational government, four the presence of subnational 
elections, two the authority of subnational elected offices, seven the freeness and fairness of 
subnational elections, and five civil liberties.xii   
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Quality of V-Dem Subnational Measures 
To what extent do the indicators of subnational democracy generate valid measures?  In other 
words do they capture the intended concepts?  To check for this I analyze the face and content 
validity, data generation process, and convergent validity. 
    
Face Validity 
A strong correspondence between the measures and the underlying concepts is apparent, 
indicating face validity.  Face validity is a judgement that “the operationalization seems like a 
good translation of the construct.”xiii  I checked the face validity of the indicators by having V-
Dem colleagues, 13 scholars of subnational democracy, and country experts participating in a V-
Dem pilot of 12 countries comment on them.xiv  After some adjustments to the indicators, V-
Dem colleagues and subnational democracy scholars evaluated them again, and I made final 
changes based on their ideas.  Readers themselves can assess the face validity of the indicators by 
examining each and reviewing the evaluation below. 
To capture the concept of “subnational,” V-Dem begins with experts’ identifications of 
local and regional government levels (v2elreggov and v2ellocgov).  The clarifications regarding 
how to identify a level, described above and in the appendix, would seem to increase the validity 
of the responses.  A second step in data collection, explained below in the Data Generation 
Process section, further increases our confidence.   
For the democratic elements—elections, government authority and constraints, and civil 
liberties—the correspondence between the measures and underlying concepts is strengthened 
through a variety of techniques.   First, de facto, rather than de jure, data are collected.  The 
underlying concepts are about practice, and experts are, in fact, reporting on what has happened 
instead of recounting what laws mandate.  The careful question wording, including the 
clarification sections, also increases the face validity.  These clarifications help overcome 
measurement challenges.  For example, what does “elected” mean at the subnational level?  The 
survey specifies for the regional offices question (v2elsrgel): 
  
“Elected” refers to offices that are directly elected by citizens or indirectly elected 
by a regional elected assembly. All other methods of obtaining office – including 
appointment by higher or lower levels of government – are considered to be non-
elected.  In classifying a position as elected one is making no judgments about the 
freeness/fairness of the election or the relative extent of suffrage. One is simply 
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indicating that there is an election and that the winner of that election (however 
conducted) generally takes office.  
 
The survey provides a comparable clarification for the local level.  The Data Generation Process 
section describes an additional data collection technique to strengthen validity for these two 
questions.   
In sum, the correspondence between the measures of the democracy elements and the 
underlying concepts seems to be good, as suggested by the face validity tests conducted by 
various groups and the correspondence of the measures to the subnational levels and the de facto 
elements of democracy.   
 
Content Validity 
Relative to face validity, content validity is slightly weaker.  Content validity is the measure’s 
inclusion of all of the meanings of the concept.  The task of measuring rich concepts like 
elections for subnational units for all countries of the world is an enormous task, so, given 
resource constraints, the indicators cannot capture all meanings.  This is evident for both 
concepts, subnational and democracy, although of the three democratic elements it is a problem 
just for government authority and constraints. 
Concentrating on two levels means that, for most countries, we are collecting data about 
all subnational levels.  Approximately 56 percent of countries have two subnational levels and 18 
percent have one, based on a sample of 82 countries from GOLD’s Local Governments in the 
World database.xv  Nearly all countries with more than two subnational levels have only three, so 
data for most, but not all, of their subnational levels have been collected.  We are capturing most 
meanings of the concept “subnational”. 
For the democratic elements, content validity is relatively strong for elections and civil 
liberties and weaker for government authority and constraints.  The electoral element has high 
content validity because it captures the multiple pathways through which elections matter to 
democracy: the existence of elected offices at regional and local levels and the holding of 
subnational elections enable citizens to participate (v2elsrgel, v2ellocelc, v2elffelrbin), free and 
fair election results reflect citizens’ preferences (v2elffelr), and regional and local elected officials 
have authority relative to non-elected officials to act on those preferences (v2elrgpwr, 
v2ellocpwr).  Moreover, the concept of free and fair elections is operationalized broadly so as to 
include many meanings of the concept:  experts take “all aspects of the pre-election period, 
election day, and the post-election process into account” (v2elffelr).  Similarly, V-Dem provides a 
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rich picture of civil liberties.  In the civil liberties section 25 measures, such as freedom from 
political killings, appear.  Sections on media, political parties and civil society include other civil 
liberties measures, such as freedom of expression.  Indicators capturing distributions and outliers 
then apply this information about country averages to the subnational level.  Including measures 
of distributions and outliers, rather than just averages, further increases the content validity of the 
electoral and civil liberties elements.          
Of the three democratic elements, government authority and constraints has the lowest 
content validity.  Experts provide information about the power of elected offices relative to 
unelected offices but, given greater resources and unlimited expert energy, additional, more 
detailed information could have been solicited about specific powers and limitations. 
Overall, the V-Dem measures capture all the subnational levels for most countries, many 
aspects of elections, and different estimates of elections and civil liberties.  The measures are less 
successful in including many meanings of government authority and constraints.   
 
Data Generation Process 
The data generation process increases the validity of the resulting measures through careful 
recruitment of country experts, reliance on multiple country experts, use of a measurement 
model to aggregate the data, and, for some indicators, a two-pronged data collection approach.xvi  
This section describes the process in brief, focusing on how it relates to the subnational 
indicators in particular.    
Country experts exclusively provide the data for subnational indicators, with the 
exceptions of v2elreggov, v2ellocgov, v2elsrgel, and v2ellocelc for which V-Dem research 
assistants also gather information.  Typically five experts provide information for each country-
year.  The V-Dem team selects individuals who are, most importantly, deeply knowledgeable 
about a country and about one or more substantive areas.  More than 80 percent of all experts 
hold Ph.Ds. or M.A.s and work at some type of research institution.   Individuals are also 
recruited based on their impartiality and connection to the country.  To help ensure impartiality, 
those who are or have been closely associated with political parties, politically affiliated think-
tanks, or senior government officials are not considered.  Typically three of the five experts are 
nationals or permanent residents of the country they are coding, so they are deeply connected to 
the country.  This global recruitment helps avoid Western and Northern bias.  It also is 
particularly advantageous for historical data.  Nationals especially, relative to non-residents, are 
likely to have considerable historical knowledge, as are those receiving graduate training outside 
U.S. programs, which tend to underemphasize study of history.  Finally, seriousness of purpose 
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and diversity of the coders’ professional background, such as employment at different 
universities, is taken into account in recruitment.xvii Experts respond to questions organized into 
topical surveys in an online interface.  Each completes only those surveys in his or her area(s) of 
expertise.  All the subnational indicators, except those about civil liberties, appear in the election 
survey.  Those about civil liberties appear in the civil liberties survey.  So, experts on each of 
these topics are being asked to characterize elections or civil liberties both nationally and 
subnationally. 
Reliance on multiple experts for each country-year improves the quality of the measures.  
A measurement model aggregates the data generated by the experts so that one data point exists 
for each country-year.  The measurement model corrects for systematic bias in coders’ answers 
by examining patterns in expert disagreement, and thus increases the validity of the resulting 
measures.  The model adjusts for experts’ own reported confidence in each response they give 
and the tendency of “domestic” coders to provide less favorable evaluations.xviii  
 For four of the indicators, we did not rely exclusively on the experts but instead used a 
two-pronged data collection approach in order to increase the validity of the measures.  For the 
existence of local and regional government (v2ellocgov, v2elreggov), V-Dem research assistants 
doublechecked the data the experts generated and arbitrated disagreements among their 
responses using information from the statoids.com database and country-specific sources.xix  The 
staff also used the names of regional and local government units the experts provided 
(v2elregnam, v2ellocnam) to determine whether experts for a particular country-year were, in 
fact, identifying the same subnational level and to resolve conflicts, as needed.  This approach 
gives us high confidence that these measures are valid.   
We also used a two-pronged approach to collect data about which offices, if any, are 
elected at the regional and local level (v2elsrgel and v2ellocelc).  In cases of significant 
disagreement among experts, aggregating their responses did not generate a single mode and thus 
measure.  In these instances, V-Dem staff adjudicated among responses by reviewing and cross-
referencing academic articles and books for the correct information.  Despite their factual nature, 
these questions often generated disagreement.  Disagreement among experts tended to occur 
when countries exhibited specific types of conditions or characteristics:  1) when there had been a 
national political crisis and subnational elected officials stayed in office and future elections were 
suspended or cancelled, 2) when two regional executives existed, such as a nationally-appointed 
official and a second elected by the regional assembly, 3) when the timing of the implementation 
of a new constitution or electoral law was not clear.  Time and staff constraints limited us to 
  
 12 
adjudicating only those country years where a mode was not generated.  Users should thus be 
aware that other data points do not necessarily represent unanimity among the experts.xx     
This review of the data generation process suggests that the procedures do not introduce 
bias and do generate quality data.  Among the indicators, however, we have less confidence about 
the measures of whether offices are elected at the regional and local levels. 
 
Convergent Validity 
The V-Dem measures closely match data from other sources.  In other words, convergent 
validity, correspondence between two measures of the same underlying concept, is high.  Scant 
existing data limit the scope of convergent validity testing.  Also, some existing data were used in 
the two-pronged data collection approaches described above, so they cannot be used for 
convergent validity tests.  That said, it is possible to compare multiple V-Dem measures with 
findings from subnational democracy research.xxi 
The first test compares V-Dem measures about unevenness in subnational elections 
freeness and fairness and respect for civil liberties— v2elsnlsff and v2clrgunev—with existing 
sources.  For comparison with v2elsnlsff, a source had to examine the conduct of subnational 
elections, not subnational conduct of national elections.  For comparison with v2clrgunev, the 
source had to focus on civil liberties, such as freedom of expression and association, rather than 
voting rights.  This limited the number of comparisons with v2clrgunev because subnational 
democracy research has focused more on elections than civil liberties.  
The extent of correspondence is illustrated in Table 1.  The first column lists the 
countries and years for which a particular source, cited in the second column, uncovered 
unevenness.xxii  Using the V-Dem measures we calculated the average level of unevenness in 
freeness and fairness of subnational elections and respect for civil liberties for each time period 
under consideration. For this table, the unevenness variables are standardized, so that a score of 
zero represents the overall mean across all countries and a score of one represents one standard 
deviation from the mean.  So, a positive value in column four or five indicates that the V-Dem 
measures show above average unevenness for subnational election freeness and fairness or 
respect for civil liberties, respectively.  A positive value, thus, represents a match between a V-
Dem measure and the account in the existing source.  An “NA” indicates that the existing source 
did not examine that type of unevenness.  The values in the parentheses in the last two columns 
are ratios of years, indicating for how many of the years identified by the source V-Dem shows 
above average unevenness for each variable.  In sum, V-Dem measures match all existing sources 
for subnational elections freeness and fairness data and all but one for respect for civil liberties 
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measures.  In 36 of the 41 elections sources and 10 of the 11 the civil liberties sources V-Dem 
identifies the same number of years as having above average unevenness.  
 
Table 1:  Convergent Validity Test for Unevenness 
 
Positive values in the last two columns indicate that V-Dem finds above average unevenness and 
thus matches the sources. The ratios in those columns indicate for how many of the years 
identified by the source V-Dem shows above average unevenness.+ 
 
Country and Years 
Source Identifies with 
Unevenness Source 
Freeness 
and Fairness 
(v2elsnlsff) 
Civil Liberties 
(v2clrgunev) 
Argentina 1983-2009 Behrend 1.232 (27/27) NA 
Argentina 1983-2003 Gervasoni (2010, “Rentier”) 1.167 (21/21) NA 
Argentina 2003-2007 Gervasoni (2010, “Measuring”) 1.459 (5/5) NA 
Argentina 1983-2005 Gibson (2005) 1.193 (23/23) NA 
Argentina 1983-2010 Gibson (2013) 1.240 (28/28) NA 
Argentina 1983-2006 Giraudy (2010, 2013, 2015) 1.204 (24/24) NA 
Argentina 1997-2009 Giraudy (2015) 1.459 (13/13) NA 
Brazil 1982-1998 Borges 0.396 (10/17) NA 
Brazil 1970-2010 Herrmann (2014) 0.361 (29/41) NA 
Brazil 2002-2006 Montero 0.722 (5/5) NA 
India 1993-2002 Beer and Mitchell 0.503 (10/10) NA 
India 1970s-1990s Lankina and Getachew (2012) 0.701 (30/30) NA 
India 1947-2010 Tudor and Ziegfeld 0.580 (61/64) NA 
Kyrgyzstan 1997 McMann 0.633 (1/1) 1.016 (1/1) 
Mexico 1980-2000 Beer 1.111 (21/21) NA 
Mexico 1990-1999 Beer and Mitchell  1.178 (10/10) 1.838 (10/10) 
Mexico 1994-2009 Benton 1.017 (16/16) NA 
Mexico 2008-2010 Danielson, et al. 0.958 (3/3) NA 
Mexico 1995-2010 Eisenstadt 0.997 (16/16) NA 
Mexico 1989-2004 Eisenstadt and Rios 1.115 (16/16) NA 
Mexico 1986-2004 Gibson (2005) 1.103 (19/19) NA 
Mexico 1998-2010 Gibson (2013) 0.958 (13/13) NA 
Mexico 1977-1988 Gilley 1.036 (12/12) 2.114 (12/12) 
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Mexico 1997-2006 Giraudy (2010, 2013) 0.958 (10/10) NA 
Mexico 1997-2009 Giraudy (2015) 0.958 (13/13)  NA 
Mexico 1986-2006 Herrmann  1.089 (21/21) 1.798 (21/21) 
Mexico 1988-2000 Lawson 1.157 (13/13) 1.859 (13/13) 
Mexico 1950-1989 Magaloni, et al. 1.029 (40/40) NA 
Mexico 1997-2008 Rebolledo 0.958 (12/12) 1.562 (12/12) 
Philippines 1896*-1995 Sidel (1999 and 2014) 1.556 (96/96) 1.263 (96/96) 
Russia 1990-1999 Hale 1.423 (10/10) NA 
Russia 1999-2004 Lankina and Getachew 1.614 (6/6) NA 
Russia 1997 McMann and Petrov 1.730 (1/1) NA 
Russia 1991-2000 Moraski and Reisinger (2003) 1.524 (10/10) NA 
Russia 1991-2001 Petrov 1.528 (11/11) -0.096 (0/11) 
Russia 1991-2005 Saikkonen 1.521 (15/15) NA 
South Africa 1994-1999 Munro 0.494 (6/6) NA 
U.S. 1890*-1960s Gibson (2013) 0.454 (70/70) NA 
U.S. 1940s Hill 0.385 (10/10) 2.138 (10/10) 
U.S. 1890*-1970 Mickey (2008) 0.450 (70/71) 2.043 (71/71) 
U.S. 1890*-1972 Mickey (2015) 0.441 (72/73) 1.987 (73/73) 
    
Total  0.923 
(370/386) 
1.531 (202/213) 
+ Average unevenness is calculated on a standardized scale. 
* V-Dem begins with 1900, so earlier data from sources is not used. 
** The total ratios count unique country-years; they do not count the same country-year more 
than once.   
 
An additional comparison can be made with the V-Dem indicators that identify outliers 
and their characteristics.  We first identified a country and time period covered by an existing case 
or country statistical study.  For each of the outlier variables, we then designated the comparison 
a match when one or more V-Dem experts named the specific subnational unit(s) (e.g. Oaxaca) 
or provided a general descriptor (e.g. South) that corresponded to the specific subnational unit(s) 
(e.g. Oaxaca) or general descriptor (e.g. South) that the source identified.  We also considered a 
match to exist when the V-Dem experts identified additional outliers that did not contradict the 
information in the existing source because they were asked to identify all outliers, whereas most 
sources do not investigate all outliers in a country.  When the V-Dem expert responses did not 
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capture all the information in the existing source or the V-Dem generalization did not fit every 
single subnational unit named in the existing source, we designated this as a “partial” match.  For 
each of the characteristics variables, the V-Dem experts chose from among 20 descriptive 
characteristics, such as rural or urban.  To determine whether there was a match required careful 
reading of the existing sources and, in some cases, research with additional materials, to learn 
about the characteristics of the outliers the sources identified.   
The match rate for all the variables was quite high.  As indicated in Table 2 across all the 
variables, V-Dem measures did not match at all only one source.  This was for Kyrgyzstan for 
v2elsnless because V-Dem experts did not agree.  Complete match rates were otherwise high, 
with percentages in the 80s or 90s for four of the six variables.  The lower match rates for 
v2elsnless and v2elsnmore are attributable to V-Dem experts not capturing all the information 
published in works by Gervasoni and Giraudy, which provide data for all the regional units 
within their countries of study.  In all the analyses, except for Kyrgyzstan, the V-Dem experts’ 
responses were consistent with each other making comparisons with existing sources more 
straightforward.   
 
Table 2:  Convergent Validity Test for Additional V-Dem Indicators percentage (frequency) 
 v2elsnless v2elsnmore v2elsnlfc v2elsnmrfc v2clrgstch v2clrgwkch 
Complete 
Match 
70 (21) 47 (9) 96 (23) 83 (10) 
 
83 (5) 83 (10) 
Partial Match 27 (8) 53 (10) 4 (1) 17 (2) 17 (1) 17 (2) 
No Match 3 (1) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
Total 100 (30) 100 (19) 100 (24) 100 (12) 100 (6) 100 (12) 
 
Existing sources enabled us to conduct two different convergent validity tests on a total 
of eight indicators. The fact that the V-Dem measures match much of the rich data from the 
literature increases confidence in the validity of the V-Dem indicators.   
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Utility Demonstration   
The V-Dem measures are not only valid, but also useful.  They highlight the importance of 
considering subnational government and democracy in global, regional, and country research, 
program development, and policymaking.  The measures are also helpful in illuminating many of 
the central issues of social science, including regimes and regime change, as well as development, 
conflict and governance.  This knowledge can, in turn, help democracy advocates create more 
effective programs and foreign officials make better policies. 
The V-Dem measures remind us of the prevalence of subnational governments and thus 
the value of studying them to better understand countries’ politics and the importance of 
addressing them in programs and policies.  The proportions of countries with regional 
government and with local government have been consistently high over time (Figure 1).  These 
statistics reflect simply the presence of government, not its authority or regime type—
characteristics captured by other measures and illustrated below.  As of 2012, 91 percent of 
countries had regional government, and 98 percent had local government.      
 
A comprehensive understanding of democracy in a country requires examination of 
regional and local politics because democratic institutions and practices exist at these levels as 
well.  This knowledge is also crucial to advocates who are designing and implementing programs 
to democratize countries and officials who develop foreign policies based, in part, on countries’ 
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level of democracy.  The percentages of countries with regional elected offices and with local 
elected offices has increased, with 68 percent of countries having some regional elected offices in 
2012 and 84 percent of countries having some local elected offices in 2012  (Figure 2).  Ninety-
one percent of the countries had elected office at at least one of these levels that year.  Moreover, 
the power of elected offices relative to non-elected offices is growing (Figure 3).  In 2012, the 
global averages for each level fell between values two, meaning, elected and non-elected offices 
are approximately equal in power at the level, and three, meaning most non-elected offices are 
subordinate to elected offices.   
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As the power of elected office has increased relative to non-elected offices, their elections 
have also become freer and fairer (Figure 4).   On average subnational elections around the world 
had improved from value two, where there was “substantial competition and freedom of 
participation but there were also significant irregularities.  It is hard to determine whether the 
irregularities affected the outcome or not (who won office)”.  By 2012 the global average 
approached value three, where there were “deficiencies and some degree of fraud and 
irregularities but these did not in the end affect the outcome (who won office).”xxiii 
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  The V-Dem measures also emphasize the importance of examining subnational politics in 
regions and countries of the world.  This is valuable information for practitioners working in 
particular locations.  For example, in MENA, as in the world, the freeness and fairness of 
subnational elections has increased in recent decades (Figure 5).  The upward trend in MENA 
precedes the Arab Spring by decades, perhaps coming as a surprise since authoritarianism was 
viewed as having such a stronghold in these years.xxiv  However, while subnational elections have 
grown more free and fair, elected offices remain subordinate to unelected offices, unlike in much 
the world.  Local and regional offices’ relative power falls closest to value one, meaning “[s]ome 
elected offices are subordinate to non-elected offices;” they do not reach two, where “[e]lected 
and non-elected offices are approximately equal in power” (Figure 6). 
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Regional and country-level analysis with V-Dem subnational measures can also provide 
helpful insights, not only about local and regional politics, but also broader phenomena.  For 
example, according to V-Dem measures, among countries that were part of the Arab Spring, 
Tunisia was unique, having both elected subnational government and an increase in the freeness 
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and fairness of subnational elections beforehand.  The subnational elections improved only 
slightly:  irregularities affected the outcome but there was some competition—a value of one.  
Nonetheless, the country is distinctive from others, such as Egypt where there was not a recent 
history of subnational elected offices and Yemen where there was not a recent, sustained 
improvement in the quality of subnational elections.  Conceivably, the experience with 
subnational elected government and the improvement in subnational election quality in Tunisia 
might have contributed to the country being the site of the first ouster and, what many have 
called, the only Arab Spring success.  This example suggests that subnational democratization 
might facilitate national political openings. 
The role of subnational developments in national political openings is only one of many 
avenues of research facilitated by V-Dem subnational measures.  The measures can also enhance 
our understanding of regimes.  When we characterize a country along the authoritarian to 
democratic spectrum, it makes sense to consider not just the national institutions and practices 
but the subnational ones too.  The V-Dem measures reveal to what extent democratic institutions 
and practices extend down to different levels of government and consistently across a country to 
help us gauge the degree of democracy in a country.  This information is available globally and 
across time.  
By enabling scholars to treat countries as heterogeneous units, the V-Dem measures 
expand the possibilities for refining regime typologies.  In particular the concept of “hybrid 
regime” could use fine-tuning.  Defined as a regime “combining democratic and authoritarian 
elements,”xxv the concept has evolved to a catch-all category with an enormous number of 
subtypes.  The extent to which democratic institutions and practices extend down to all levels of 
government and throughout the territory of a country can be important dimensions on which to 
distinguish among hybrid regimes.  More fine-tuned regime types can be helpful to practitioners 
in their creation of programs and policies. 
For a country to be truly democratic, democratic rights and institutions must exist 
throughout its territory.  V-Dem measures can help us uncover the obstacles to this.  Preliminary 
analysis with the measures shows that subnational regime variation is common when certain 
geographic and demographic characteristics increase social heterogeneity and other challenges to 
broadcasting power, thus making it difficult for the national government to control subnational 
political units.xxvi   
V-Dem measures can also reveal how subnational regime variation has been overcome to 
create true democracies—information important to both scholars and practitioners.  The 
measures demonstrate that subnational regime variation is not just a modern problem.  
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Approximately 50 to 60 percent of countries have experienced some or significant unevenness in 
government respect for civil liberties throughout the years (Figure 7).  Unevenness in the freeness 
and fairness of subnational elections has generally crept upward over time from around 45 
percent to near 60 percent.  Further research using the V-Dem measures can reveal how this 
problem has been overcome in some countries historically. 
 
Understanding how democratic institutions and practices develop throughout a country is 
part of the story linking democratic transition to democratic consolidation.  Currently the 
different schools of democratization thought implicitly assume democracy will automatically 
spread throughout a country once national elites introduce competitive elections and (expanded) 
civil liberties or the country’s socioeconomic conditions make it ripe for democracy.  The V-Dem 
measures and prior research demonstrate that this is not the case.  The V-Dem measures can 
illuminate this issue and thus help explain the process between democratic transition and 
consolidation.  
V-Dem measures can also clarify the relationships between institutions and practices at 
different levels, which are important to our understanding of regime types and regime change, 
and specifically democracy and democratization.  Consider the interaction between national and 
subnational elections.  Academics and practitioners typically overlook any connections between 
them.  The V-Dem measures reveal the connections between national and subnational elections 
showing that two scenarios are common.  Preliminary analysis indicates that in some countries a 
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democratic-leaning national government introduces both competitive, free and fair subnational 
and national elections at the same time or in quick succession.  More interesting is the second 
scenario where the holding of relatively free and fair subnational elections over time forces 
authoritarian national leaders to eventually introduce competitive, free and fair national 
elections.xxvii  
The V-Dem subnational indicators hold promise for helping us improve our regime 
typologies and theories of democratization and, more broadly, regime change.  They also will be 
helpful to understanding subnational democracy in particular.  The outlier questions will enable 
scholars to identify specific subnational political units or areas of countries with subnational 
political units that have different institutions and practices from others in the country.  Previously 
identifying these enclaves has been a time-consuming, labor-intensive task.  With V-Dem 
measures new lines of inquiry are also possible:  For example, are enclaves that are less 
democratic or more democratic than their national regimes more common?  Research has tended 
to focus on less democratic enclaves, driven in part by the logic that a national regime would not 
let a more democratic enclave exist.xxviii  Preliminary research with the V-Dem measures suggests 
that enclaves exist in both countries with democratic national governments and those with non-
democratic national governments; approximately 30 percent of countries with civil liberties or 
election unevenness in 2012 had authoritarian national regimes.   
 Beyond questions of regimes, regime change, and subnational democracy, the V-Dem 
subnational indicators can help scholars study a wide variety of different issues.  Increasingly 
scholars have been studying central questions of social science at the subnational level because of 
methodological advantages.xxix  However, this approach has been hampered because of the 
paucity of data.  V-Dem measures will facilitate the study of democracy’s impact on development 
and on conflict, for example.  There are also subnational-related questions that scholars will be 
able to investigate more effectively, such as decentralization’s and federalism’s impact on 
democracy, subnational politics’ impact on distribution and national reform, and subnational 
institutions’ effect on party politics, clientelism, and political participation.  Findings from these 
studies can assist practitioners in the fields of development, conflict, and governance. 
Greater attention to subnational institutions and practices can help social scientists refine 
regime typologies, improve theories of democratization and regime change, better understand 
subnational democracy, and illuminate issues of development, conflict, and governance.  Findings 
from this research and basic subnational information itself can enable democracy advocates to 
design better programs and foreign officials to make better policies.  The V-Dem measures can 
facilitate achievement of these objectives. 
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 The measures suffer from weaknesses, but they also have significant strengths.  The 
measures are weaker in capturing multiple meanings of government authority and constraints and 
providing highly valid data about when subnational elections are held.  They do, however, capture 
all subnational levels for most countries, different elements of subnational elections, and a variety 
of dimensions of both elections and civil liberties well.  The measures also offer excellent global 
and temporal coverage.  As global, times series measures, the V-Dem subnational indicators 
overcome a significant data void and consequently hold considerable promise for improved and 
new research and better programs and policy.  
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Notes 
                                                
i "Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development"  2015. 
ii The dataset is available at https://www.v-dem.net/en/data/.  Updating to the current year and plans to collect data 
for the microstates are in progress.        
iii See, for example, The Fiscal Austerity and Urban Innovation Project (FAUI), http://faui.uchicago.edu/; Daniel 
Treisman’s decentralization dataset, 
http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/treisman/Pages/publishedpapers.html and Hooghe, et al. 2016.   
iv "Structure and Operation of Local and Regional Democracy"  2014.  
v "Decentralization and Local Government in the World: Country Profiles"  2008. 
vi See Table 1 for the distribution of studies across countries. 
vii For V-Dem’s purposes, democracy is an attribute of polities.    
viii Dahl 1971. 
ix For a discussion of these principles, see Coppedge, et al. 2011.   
x "Decentralization and Local Government in the World: Country Profiles"  2008. 
xi See the codebook for details, Coppedge, et al. 2015b. 
xii Other V-Dem indicators, such as those about political parties and the judiciary, also consider subnational practices 
and institutions, although not as directly.  See Coppedge, et al. 2015b. 
xiii Trochim, et al. 2016. 
xiv Pilot countries included two dissimilar countries from each region of the world. 
xv "Decentralization and Local Government in the World: Country Profiles"  2008.  
xvi On examining the data generation process, see McMann, et al. 2016. 
xvii Coppedge, et al. 2015a.   
xviii Pemstein, et al. 2015; Coppedge, et al. 2015a.   
xix The site statoids.com provides information about subdivisions of countries with short descriptions of change over 
times.   
xx The data generation process can also be evaluated by the extent of missing data. The percentage of missing 
measures is in the single digits or zero for most of the subnational indicators, and the missing data are attributable to 
administrative oversights that are now being corrected.  Six variables (v2elsnlpop, v2elsnmpop, v2elsnlfc, v2elsnmrfc, 
v2clrgstch, v2clrgwkch)—all measures of outliers—are missing 20 to 40 percent of their data.  We suspected these 
questions would be difficult for experts to answer, and the surveys instructed them to not answer what they did not 
know.  These variables should be used cautiously because of the missingness.  For the other 16 indicators, this is not 
a complication.   
xxi Existing sources do not provide data to enable convergent validity testing for the indicators for outlier population 
estimates, subnational election freeness and fairness, and the power of elected offices. 
xxii Scholars have not researched when democratic institutions and practices are consistent within countries, so we are 
not able to conduct such convergent validity tests.   
xxiii Figures 3 and 4 can be calculated an alternative way because experts are asked in prior questions “generally” 
whether offices are elected.  As a result of this, experts can indicate that offices are generally not elected but then 
respond about the exceptionally elected offices for the questions on relative power and exceptional elections for the 
question about freeness and fairness.  When country-years in which no elected offices existed (both v2elsrgel and 
v2ellocelc equal zero) are excluded, the increase in Figure 3 is still visible, albeit from the mid-20th century, and the 
lines shift upward.  For Figure 4 there is only a minor change:  in the first half of the 20th century the line shifts 
upward closer to the midpoint between values two and three.   
xxiv Bellin 2012. 
xxv Diamond 2002.  
xxvi McMann, et al. “Governing Countries:  A Theory of Subnational Regime Variation.”  
xxvii McMann 2015. 
xxviii Linz and Stepan 1996.  
xxix Giraudy, et al.   
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Appendix 
 
v2elreggov:  Regional government exists - Question: Is there a regional government?  
 
Clarification: Regional government is typically the second-highest level of government, just 
below the national government. There are many names for units at this level; some common 
ones are regions, provinces, states, departments, and cantons.  
Countries with more than two subnational levels may have multiple levels that fit the 
definition of regional government. If this is the case, for all questions about regional 
government please code the regional level that, in practice, has the most responsibilities (e.g. 
making laws, providing primary, education, maintaining roads, policing, etc.) and resources to 
carry out those responsibilities.  
Some countries are so small that, now or in earlier time periods, they have only local 
government and not regional government. If this is the case, please code this question as “0” 
for the appropriate time period.  
If you have questions about identifying the regional government for your country, please 
send an email inquiry to your Regional manager (RM) or to V-Dem (using the email contact 
designated for your country).  
 
Responses:  
0: No.  
1: Yes.  
 
 
v2elregnam: Regional government name - Question: What is the term(s) for the regional 
government units?  
 
Clarification: If different types of units exist at this single level of regional government use 
multiple terms such as “provinces and federal city.” If the language of politics in your country 
is not English, please use whatever language is commonly used. For example, in Germany 
regional units are called “Lander.”  
 
Responses: Text  
 
v2elsrgel: Regional government elected - Question: At the regional level, are government offices 
elected in practice?  
 
Clarification: “Government offices” here refers to a regional executive and a regional 
assembly, not a judiciary and not minor bureaucrats. An executive is a single individual (or a 
very small group) (e.g., a governor). An assembly is a larger body of officials, who may be 
divided into two chambers.  
 “Elected” refers to offices that are directly elected by citizens or indirectly elected by a  
regional elected assembly. All other methods of obtaining office – including appointment by 
higher or lower levels of government – are considered to be non- elected.  
In classifying a position as elected one is making no judgments about the freeness/fairness of 
the election or the relative extent of suffrage. One is simply indicating that there is an election 
and that the winner of that election (however conducted) generally takes office.  
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Responses:  
0: Generally, offices at the regional level are not elected.    
1: Generally, the regional executive is elected but not the assembly.   
2: Generally, the regional assembly is elected but not the executive.   
3: Generally, the regional executive is elected and there is no assembly.   
4: Generally, the regional assembly is elected and there is no executive.   
5: Generally, the regional executive and assembly are elected.    
 
 
v2elrgpwr: Regional offices relative power - Question: How would you characterize the relative 
power, in practice, of elected and non- elected offices at the regional level? 
 
Clarification: We are concerned with the relative power of regional offices to each other, not 
the power of regional offices relative to higher or lower levels of government.  
Please consider only major offices, such as the executive, assembly, and judiciary, not those 
of minor bureaucrats. (A body of government officials, such as an assembly or judiciary, 
counts as one office.)  
An office is "subordinate" if its officeholders can be chosen and removed by another office 
or if its decisions can be blocked or modified by another office, but it cannot similarly 
constrain the other office.  
 
Responses:  
0: All or nearly all elected offices are subordinate to non-elected offices at the regional level. 
1: Some elected offices are subordinate to non-elected offices at the regional level.  
2: Elected and non-elected offices are approximately equal in power at the regional level. 
3: Most non-elected offices are subordinate to elected offices at the regional level.  
4: All or nearly all non-elected offices are subordinate to elected offices at the regional level.  
 
 
v2ellocgov: Local Government Exists - Question: Is there a local government?  
 
Clarification: Local government refers to the level of government below the regional 
government. There are many names for units at this level; some common ones are counties, 
communes, cities, municipalities, towns, rural municipalities, and villages.  
Countries with more than two subnational levels may have multiple levels that fit the 
definition of local government. If this is the case, please code the local level that, in practice, 
has the most responsibilities (e.g. making laws, providing primary, education, maintaining 
roads, policing, etc.) and resources to carry out those responsibilities.  
 
Responses:  
0: No.  
1: Yes.  
 
v2ellocnam: Local Government Name - Question: What is the term(s) for the local government 
units?  
 
Clarification: If different types of units exist at this single level of local government, use 
multiple terms. For example, different terms may be needed for rural and urban units. If the 
language of politics in your country is not English, please use whatever language is commonly 
used. For example, in Mexico local units are called “Municipios.”  
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Responses: Text  
 
 
v2ellocelc: Local Government Elected - Question: At the local level, are government (local 
government) offices elected in practice?  
 
Clarification: [Note to reader:  clarification is the same as for v2elsrgel, except “local,” rather 
than “regional,” and “mayor” as the example are used here.] 
 
Responses:  
0: Generally, offices at the local level are not elected.    
1: Generally, the local executive is elected but not the assembly.   
2: Generally, the local assembly is elected but not the executive.   
3: Generally, the local executive is elected and there is no assembly. 
4: Generally, the local assembly is elected and there is no executive.   
5: Generally, the local executive and assembly are elected.   
 
 
v2ellocpwr: Local offices relative power  - Question: How would you characterize the relative 
power, in practice, of elected and non-elected offices at the local level? 
 
Clarification: We are concerned with the relative power of local offices to each other, not the 
power of local offices relative to higher levels of government.   [Note to reader:  “Offices” 
and “subordinate” are also defined here, as they are for v2elrgpwr.] 
 
Responses:  
0: All or nearly all elected offices are subordinate to non-elected offices at the local level.  
1: Some elected offices are subordinate to non-elected offices at the local level.  
2: Elected and non-elected offices are approximately equal in power at the local level. 
3: Most non-elected offices are subordinate to elected offices at the local level. 
4: All or nearly all non-elected offices are subordinate to elected offices at the local level.  
 
 
v2elffelr: Subnational elections free and fair - Question: Taking all aspects of the pre-election 
period, election day, and the post-election process into account, would you consider subnational 
elections (regional and local, as previously identified) to be free and fair on average?  
 
Clarification: This question refers to subnational levels that have elected offices and elections. 
It does not refer to subnational levels without elected offices and elections. If there were no 
subnational elections in any of the years covered in this survey, choose option 5.  
 “Free and fair” refers to all aspects of the election process except the extent of suffrage (by 
law). Thus, a free and fair election may occur even if the law excludes significant groups (we 
measure that issue separately).  
 
Responses:  
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0: No, not at all. The elections were fundamentally flawed and the official results had little if 
anything to do with the 'will of the people' (who won office).  
1: Not really. While the elections allowed for some competition, the irregularities in the end 
affected the outcome of the elections (who won office).  
2: Ambiguous. There was substantial competition and freedom of participation but there 
were also significant irregularities. It is hard to determine whether the irregularities affected 
the outcome or not (who won office).  
3: Yes, somewhat. There were deficiencies and some degree of fraud and irregularities but 
these did not in the end affect the outcome (who won office).  
4: Yes. There was some amount of human error and logistical restrictions but these were 
largely unintentional and without significant consequences.  
 
 
v2elffelrbin: Subnational elections - Question: Are subnational elections held?  
 
Responses:  
0: No.  
1: Yes.  
 
Note: The former category “5” from variable v2elffelr is recoded as a separate variable 
(v2elffelrbin). If a coder chose the 5th category in the original question, she receives 0 in the 
new “v2elffelrbin” variable (corresponding to the answer, no, there were no subnational 
elections); otherwise she receives 1 (yes, there are subnational elections held).  
 
 
v2elsnlsff: Subnational election unevenness - Question: Does the freeness and fairness of 
subnational elections vary across different areas of the country? 
 
Clarification: Subnational elections refer to elections to regional or local offices, as specified 
above. 
  
Responses:  
0: No. Subnational elections in most or all areas of the country are equally free and fair (or, 
alternatively, equally not free and not fair).  
1: Somewhat. Subnational elections in some areas of the country are somewhat more free and 
fair (or, alternatively, somewhat less free and fair) than subnational elections in other areas of 
the country.  
2: Yes. Subnational elections in some areas of the country are significantly more free and fair 
(or, alternatively, significantly less free and fair) than subnational elections in other areas of 
the country.  
  
v2elsnless: Subnational election area less free and fair name - Question: In which areas of the 
country are subnational elections significantly less free and fair than the country average for 
subnational elections? 
 
Clarification: If providing names of all the relevant territorial units is not possible, use broad 
categories (for example, “the North”).  
 
Responses: Text  
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v2elsnlpop: Subnational election area less free and fair population - Question: What percentage 
(%) of the total population of the country lives in the areas you designated as having elections 
that are significantly less free and fair?  
 
Responses: Percent 
  
 
v2elsnlfc: Subnational election area less free and fair characteristics - Question: How would you 
describe the areas of the country in which elections are  
significantly less free and fair?    
 
Clarification: Choose all that apply. 
 
Responses:  
0: Rural. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc_0] 
1: Urban. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc_1] 
2: Areas that are less economically developed. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc_2] 
3: Areas that are more economically developed. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc_3] 
4: Inside the capital city. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc_4] 
5: Outside the capital city. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc_5] 
6: North. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc_6] 
7: South. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc_7] 
8: West. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc_8] 
9: East. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc_9] 
10: Areas of civil unrest (including areas where insurgent groups are active). (0=No, 1=Yes) 
[v2elsnlfc_10] 
11: Areas where illicit activity is widespread. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc_11]  
12: Areas that are very sparsely populated. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc_12]  
13: Areas that are remote (difficult to reach by available transportation, for  
example). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc_13]  
14: Areas where there are indigenous populations. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc_14]  
15: Areas where the national ruling party or group is strong. (0=No, 1=Yes)  
[v2elsnlfc_15] 
16: Areas where the national ruling party or group is weak. (0=No, 1=Yes)  
[v2elsnlfc_16] 
17: Areas that were subject to a longer period of foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes)  
[v2elsnlfc_17] 
18: Areas that were subject to a shorter period of foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes)  
[v2elsnlfc_18] 
19: Areas that were recently subject to foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc_19]  
20: Areas that have not recently been subject to foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes)  
[v2elsnlfc_20] 
21: None of the above. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc_21]  
  
 
v2elsnmore: Subnational election area more free and fair name - Question: In which areas of the 
country are subnational elections significantly more free and fair than the country average for 
subnational elections?  
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Clarification: If providing names of all the relevant territorial units is not possible, use broad 
categories (for example, “the North”).  
 
Responses: Text  
 
 
v2elsnmpop: Subnational election area more free and fair population - Question: What 
percentage (%) of the total population of the country lives in the areas you designated as having 
elections that are significantly more free and fair?  
 
Responses: Percent 
 
 
v2elsnmrfc: Subnational election area more free and fair characteristics - Question: How would 
you describe the areas of the country in which elections are significantly more free and fair?  
 
Clarification: Choose all that apply.  
 
Responses:   [Note to reader:  Same as for v2elsnlfc.] 
 
 
v2clrgunev: Subnational civil liberties unevenness - Question: Does government respect for civil 
liberties vary across different areas of the country?  
 
Responses:  
0: No. Government officials in most or all areas of the country equally respect (or, 
alternatively, equally do not respect) civil liberties.  
1: Somewhat. Government officials in some areas of the country respect civil liberties 
somewhat more (or, alternatively, somewhat less) than government officials in other areas of 
the country.  
2: Yes. Government officials in some areas of the country respect civil liberties significantly 
more (or, alternatively, significantly less) than government officials in other areas of the 
country.  
 
 
v2clsnmpct: Stronger civil liberties population - Question: What percentage (%) of the total 
population of the country lives in the areas where government officials’ respect for civil liberties 
is significantly stronger than the country average?  
 
Responses: Percent  
 
 
v2clrgstch: Stronger respect for civil liberties characteristics - Question: How would you 
describe the areas of the country where government officials’ respect for civil liberties is 
significantly stronger?  
 
Clarification: Choose all that apply.  
 
Responses:  [Note to reader:  Same as for v2elsnlfc.] 
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v2clsnlpct: Weaker civil liberties population - Question: What percentage (%) of the total 
population of the country lives in the areas where government officials’ respect for civil liberties 
is significantly weaker than the country average?  
 
Responses: Percent  
 
 
v2clrgwkch: Weaker civil liberties characteristics - Question: How would you describe the areas 
of the country where government officials’ respect for civil liberties is significantly weaker?  
 
Clarification: Choose all that apply.  
 
Responses: [Note to reader:  Same as for v2elsnlfc.] 
